You Be the Judge: Fort Hood Shooter--Mentally Disturbed or Terrorist?

This morning's ABC report that Maj. Nidal Malik Hasan had made attempts to contact Al Qaeda raises even more questions surrounding the motives behind the recent Fort Hood shooting. Was the Fort Hood shooter just another mentally disturbed person bent on violence, or a homegrown Islamic terrorist? You be the judge.

. . . read more

You Be The Judge: Officer Responding to 911 Call Shoots Homeowner 6 Times

This homeowner had a burglar held at gunpoint awaiting the arrival of the police, but when they arrived, one officer shot him 6 times without giving a verbal warning. He was then cleared by his department of wrongdoing. Should this officer be held accountable? Or were his actions justified?

. . . read more

Signals Hidden in Plain Sight

Criminals as well as terrorists signal illegal activity either unwittingly or perhaps in some cases with disdain and contempt for those who are positioned to watch for such behavior. The ability to detect that signal from the din of constant activity intrinsic to daily operations is crucial. Recognition and collection of the signal must be complemented by a robust analytical capability to match with similar signals to discern potential patterns of activity and generate operational leads. In large measure that capability is a key component of the existing and emergent fusion centers.

It strikes me that my colleagues Brian Kelly and Barry McManus (see p. 27 and p. 30) have, without collaboration, provided an excellent platform for discussion on signals – intentionally obscured, concealed, disguised, or recast, yet each hidden in plain sight and knowable to the trained observer. Both view the world through an Intelligence Community lens, yet each has seamlessly translated that knowledge and experience into an application for law enforcement. In Brian’s case through the discipline of counterintelligence, and Barry with the deciphering of human behavior and integration of that knowledge into a training program applicable to public safety officers.

Our Nations’ law enforcement officers are uniquely positioned, yet not always adequately trained to understand the criticality of the counterintelligence mission. Law enforcement largely understands the need to penetrate criminal organizations through confidential informants and undercover officers to gain the best intelligence to disrupt operational activity, dismantle the organizational structure and any preconceived plan for leadership succession, and, ultimately, to build a prosecutable case. The fundamental policing skill of persistent observation is vital yet incomplete without the understanding of the risks posed by a different form of adversary, whose coin is the complete evisceration of the tenets of a free and open society by whatever means, including the targeting of law enforcement officers and the undermining of critical infrastructure those officers are responsible for safeguarding. The inherent internal human radar of law enforcement so effectively utilized against criminal enterprises and individuals is not generally focused on even the idea of hostile targeting. It is an often invisible force, hard to identify, harder to articulate, and insidious by nature.

Brian illustrated the most egregious of threats posed by trusted individuals inside the wire, though many more are likely to operate and hide in plain sight, much like Russian spy Robert Hansen did, mocking the very system they have been part of for decades. In hindsight, the cumulative noise of his signals and others like him was deafening, yet went unheard and unaddressed. Organizationally, it is antithetical to the bonds which exist behind the blue wall of law enforcement to believe that a fellow officer could willingly collaborate with a hostile nation, or individually to recognize an approach at compromise which is unfamiliar and appears innocent.

The CI skill set resides within the intelligence community and military services which highlights an enormous opportunity to collaborate with law enforcement and to share best practices across these communities of interest, acknowledging in advance that mission responsibilities do in fact differ, that there are legal considerations, and organizational cultures skilled at compartmentalization are not traditionally adept at sharing. Not withstanding, the opportunity to share the specialized training may in fact obviate future penetrations, or at a minimum, detect them early enough to mitigate potential damage.

The “Human Audit” training which Barry McManus refers to in fact puts science behind the art of streetcraft, which has been both refined and passed down through generations of policing, formally and informally, and is continually enhanced by the experiences of police officers involved in the inevitable waltz with violators, some smart and some dumb, but all of whom attempt to outwit those destined to pursue them. If in fact the training does equip an officer to reliably detect deception and, potentially, intention, the proficiency will provide a reinforced layer of officer safety, and additionally, provide the means to vett informants, witnesses, and victims alike, and to dramatically improve the cultural/contextual obstacles confronted daily by police officers in Diaspora communities.

The ability to read an emotion without benefit of a spoken or understood communication capability would seem an indisputable precept of training at all levels of law enforcement. This training is adapted to practitioners and requires active interaction with native-born role players and a constant feedback loop to test skill assimilation throughout the training cycle. Law enforcement officers have limitless opportunities to apply the training in daily operational activity whether dealing with civil or criminal issues and are better prepared when confronted with a new form of adversary.

Dr. Kathleen L. Kiernan, a 29-year veteran of federal law enforcement, served as the Assistant Director for the Office of Strategic Intelligence and Information for the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF). She is currently CEO of The Kiernan Group and adjunct professor at Sam Houston State University.

. . . read more

Law Enforcemtent-Intelligence Partnership

The developing relationship between law enforcement and the Intelligence Community has taken a major step forward with the launching of an initiative which will bring together experts from both disciplines to examine the parallels between criminality and terrorism-more specifically, the signatures that both discriminate among and between groups and those which transcend culture, language, ethnicity, and geography. The goal is to inform and influence the tradecraft of analysis by leveraging the knowledge and experience historically resident, yet in many cases under-utilized within the domain of law enforcement. The tactics, techniques, and procedures endemic to law enforcement professionals across the world ranging from community policing through criminal investigation to the application of a cold-case methodology to discern the motive, intent, and capabilities of potential terrorists will enhance analytical and operational expertise as well as inform predictive analysis as terrorists frequently replicate the practices of criminals in the acquisition and concealment of weapons, the raising and transference of financing and the recruitment of adherents to the cause. While end results are in fact different by design, criminals seek profit as an end game while terrorists seek profit as a means to a different end; there are opportunities to interrupt and thus defeat that potential kill-chain.

Arguably, intelligence professionals have developed well-honed approaches to dealing with a foreign adversary on foreign soil. Organizationally, they have the technological and human capital to deploy outside of the continental United States, however have been legally restricted from collection and activity on domestic soil. That approach has been successful for the past half of a century when adversaries were at least known if not understood. In the past half of a decade, the rules irrevocably changed, requiring not only a review of capabilities but also a rethinking of priorities to defeat an amorphous adversary with tentacles that extend to if not germinate from domestic soil. Those best positioned to observe and to identify abnormalities in behavior and assimilation patterns are the Nation’s law enforcement professionals.

Until only recently, and in most cases only sparingly, has state and local law enforcement had access to or influence in the Intelligence Community. The opportunity to obtain security clearances has been hindered by an inefficient and arduous process, compounded by a lack of existing infrastructure at the local level to support the receipt and handling of classified information. The National Intelligence Strategy has for the first time publicly and affirmatively stated the compelling need to partner with law enforcement and the private sector to build a stronger multi-disciplinary community to defeat current and emergent threats to the National Security of the United States. The stated intent to leverage expertise wherever it resides is a change that is both historical and profound. The newly confirmed Director of National Intelligence (DNI) has clearly signaled that change in his acceptance speech as he discussed his intention to not only authorize but compel the recruitment and hiring of first generation native speakers from across cultures which in the past was considered taboo. The application of cultural and contextual intelligence to the standing disciplines will significantly enhance our capabilities.

One of the inaugural efforts to develop this partnership will occur in the upcoming months as experts examine the tenets of law enforcement and identify patterns of activity supported by the underground economies which have been leveraged by the criminal genre to escape detection and facilitate illegal activity. Entitled Summer Hard Problem (SHARP), law enforcement personnel will partner with the Intelligence Community and academia to study the clear nexus between criminality and terrorism.

Designed as a think-tank atmosphere with a critical difference, this will not be merely a comprehensive study that is soon lost in the omnipresent avalanche of data at the national level, but one which will influence training, recruitment and decision-making from the perspective of the practitioner engaged in daily sound policing activity to policy makers at the national level. It provides an opportunity which transcends the ongoing debates related to information sharing and ensures the collective knowledge and experience resident within law enforcement is no longer obscured, or hidden in plain sight.

Dr. Kathleen L. Kiernan, a 29-year veteran of federal law enforcement, served as the Assistant Director for the Office of Strategic Intelligence and Information for the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF). She is currently CEO of The Kiernan Group and adjunct professor at Sam Houston State University.

. . . read more

ACPO New Guidelines For Cannabis Possession

Some police colleagues in the United States viewed with trepidation the news that the “Brits” were going soft on the possession of cannabis. You may recall that the drug had been declassified. In 2004, guidelines were introduced that developed the concept of “Street Warnings” for the possession of cannabis. However, in January 2006, the Home Secretary, having taken advice from the Advisory Counsel on the Misuse of Drugs (ACMD), decided to keep cannabis as a Class C Drug. Police officers became confused, and as a result the top police chiefs commissioned their professional organization, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), to write updated guidelines for police officers dealing with cases of cannabis possession. They did so. The guidelines were published and implemented on January 17, 2007.



The aims of the ACPO guidelines are as follows:

* To give a justifiable and proportionate response in dealing with persons found in possession of cannabis which can be seen to be ethical and non-discriminatory by the public and therefore gain trust in the Criminal Justice system from all members of the community;
* To enable the police service to give greater focus and resources to organizational and community policing priorities by dealing with offenders found in possession of cannabis in a manner which saves time and is less bureaucratic;
* To maintain an enforcement and prosecution strategy that delivers the national message that cannabis is harmful and remains illegal.

ACPO had found through consultation that the wording contained in previous guidelines was ambiguous, and some officers interpreted it as being a warning that could only be given on the street. In reality, the fact was that the warning could be given anywhere. The new guidelines change the term to “Cannabis Warning”.

So what are the new guidelines? ACPO states, “As a general guide, when police find a person in possession of a small amount of cannabis, they should:

* Investigate the circumstances surrounding the alleged possession, including any lawful excuse.
* Eliminate any suspicion of a more serious offence, such as possession with intent to supply. (The amount of cannabis in possession of the offender is irrelevant if there is other evidence of intent to supply.)
* Seize cannabis and secure evidence according to local procedure. There must be compliance with the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) and its Codes. If an officer is not experienced in handling cannabis or has any doubt as to the nature of the substance, she or he should call for the assistance of an officer who has the relevant experience.
* Complete contemporaneous notes of the incident, that are PACE compliant and cover the points to prove for the offence, in line with local procedures.
* Complete local recording systems, such as stop/search forms, property seized logs, and criminal intelligence reports.
* Ensure a record is made of the crime within local crime recording procedures. Under Home Office counting rules this will be treated as a sanctioned detection, providing the correct procedures have been followed”.1


The officer then uses her or his discretion on whether or not a warning is the most appropriate action. First, the offender has to admit possession. Second, there has to be no evidence that there was intent to supply to other people. Third, the officer has to decide that the appropriate course is to proceed with a “cannabis warning.” The officer warns the offender that a record of the investigation will be recorded by the police; that this record will show the offence of possession by them, and, for statistical purposes, it will be recorded as a detected crime. One thing the receipt of a warning will not do is create the equivalent of a criminal record against the person found in possession. If the offender disputes the possession of cannabis or will not comply with the procedure then the offender can be arrested.


The guidelines seem to be good common sense. An offender may still be arrested, for example, if he or she is so intoxicated that they would not be able to understand the warning procedure, or it is necessary to prevent the offender suffering physical injury, or causing someone else injury. And there are special provisions for young offenders, especially those under the age of ten. The latter are considered “at risk” and this will prompt referrals to other agencies.


Many in the United States may view this as a liberalization of the lower end of the drug problem, but others would see it as a genuine attempt to keep people out of the criminal justice system. In turn, this could have the effect of improving police/community relations, and freeing up police time. Could this work in the United States – be your own judge – read the guidelines and the FAQs at http://www/acpo.police.uk/policies.asp.

Notes

1. See “Guidance on Policing Cannabis – Use of Cannabis Warnings” ACPO (2006:p4; 2.3.2.) London, UK.


David Webb was formerly Chief Superintendent of Police in the United Kingdom with a career spanning over 30 years.

. . . read more

You Be The Judge: Florida Child Strangled By Python

Police are expected to bring charges against the owner of a pet python that strangled a 2-year-old Florida girl in her crib, killing her.

According to police, the snake's cage was not locked as mandated by Florida law, and the owner did not have a required permit to own the snake. You be the judge: Has this family been punished enough, or should criminal charges be filed? And if so, what sentence would you pass?

. . . read more

Artificial Intelligence in the Fight against Terrorism

Today I want to take you into the realm of Artificial Intelligence and look at its potential to create an impact in the fight against terrorism.

The aim of AI (artificial intelligence) is to get at what is happening when one’s mind silently and invisibly chooses, from a myriad of alternatives, which one makes most sense in a very complex situation. In many real-life situations, deductive reasoning is inappropriate, not because it would give wrong answers, but because there are too many correct but irrelevant statements which can be made; there are just too many things to take into account simultaneously for reasoning alone to be sufficient.

— Douglas Hofstadter, Godel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid

Today, artificial intelligence (AI) is a concept that is too big to ignore and too exciting to deny. We should not be frightened by it—either its “hype” or its implied shortfalls—but rather should use it as an aid in the development of practical tools. The concept has a wider application than computer systems alone and should be viewed as a vehicle that helps us to think about the way in which we reason, how we draw inferences from given facts, and what rules we use to tie those facts together.

In a recent trade journal it was predicted by market researchers Frost and Sullivan that the size of the artificial intelligence market for the U.S. military will more than double in the next five years. I say this not to suggest that by throwing money into an AI program we can produce a do-anything expert system but to encourage the use of such programs where they best serve our needs. In the area of law enforcement, Richard Larson and his colleagues at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology have been advocating the use of expert systems for a number of years. In this article I propose to explore some of the problems we face in understanding and dealing with terrorism and then to consider the use of artificial intelligence techniques as practitioner tools, commenting on their suitability.

Expert systems require a means of simulating reasoning—of inferencing—most commonly by utilizing a set of “if/then” rules. They also require a knowledge base, which may in turn necessitate the elucidation of human experts regarding how to approach a particular problem. You may recall the hackneyed example of the system envisaged to aid in medical diagnosis. A patient is seated in front of a small computer terminal. On its screen a series of questions appear. The patient responds to these questions, which are diagnostic in nature and based on the best knowledge of experts—the doctors. The system eliminates the possible medical conditions based on the known symptoms for those conditions. The result is a diagnosis with an expert opinion of the likely ailment. This is an example of a simple expert system.

With these sorts of ideas at the back of our minds, let us ask ourselves if expert systems could have some application to the various ways that we deal with the problem of terrorism.

We know that acts of terrorism can take place in diverse locations of the world and be perpetrated by numerous actors. We also know that the nature of the act, like the problem of crime itself, may change over time. Many commentators have argued that the places where crimes are committed and the times at which they are committed are unpredictable; therefore, any positive policing activity directed toward the prevention of crime is virtually impossible. I do not subscribe to this view and would argue that crimes in general have a relatively high degree of predictability. As all advocates of situational crime prevention techniques know from experience, distinctive patterns and trends can be utilized to take both preemptive and detective action.

In the case of those crimes we might call terroristic, I would argue that a similar situation exists. Analysis indicates that factors governing the commission of acts of terrorism correlate largely to sociopolitical factors pertaining in a particular country or to the interaction of events that may occur in more than one country. The acts themselves can be characterized as particular types, whether they be kidnapping, extortion, hijacking, or bombing. What I am saying is that there are definable connections among places, people, and events. Where such connections exist, statements—then rules—can be made about them.

It is the democracies of the world that are most vulnerable to acts of terrorism. One might argue that a democracy poses the greatest danger to itself by its response to terrorism. If, for example, it reacts with what are seen as harsh or oppressive security measures, it may alienate the public it is trying to protect. I have recently heard of two such instances that may be worthy of mention. When France suffered a recent series of bombings in Paris, the government put large groups of uniformed officers, heavily armed, on patrol in the shopping areas of the city. Considerable comment was made by Parisians and visitors alike about this reaction. Similarly, the sight of uniformed police officers carrying machine guns at London’s Heathrow Airport is also the subject of considerable comment. Both of these responses are what we might call “out of character.” We know why these decisions were made, but if there were another way to deter terrorists or protect the public I am sure we would choose it.

Conventional intelligence gathering in the area of law enforcement has been questioned by some observers, who suggest that it does nothing more than meet statutory requirements for data (i.e., it is a statistical or administrative function of the state). We might also question whether we have traditionally gathered the kind of information we need to prevent or detect the crimes known as acts of terrorism or whether we collect data in a less methodological way. I would ask anyone working in the law enforcement area to consider their own method of data collection in the post-incident phase of a crime. Data files often contain pages of free text that explain the activities and thoughts of the investigator in this post-incident phase; however, for the most part the data will refer to unsolved crimes. What is the currency of such data? How should we proceed to undertake its analysis? How long does it remain in some useful and retrievable form?

Questions such as these may seem fundamental, but I would suspect that when investigations into acts of terrorism are carried out, the methods of data capturing, recording, and storage are, in some way, similar. In order to achieve the best practice to produce the best intelligence, we must ensure that all our detectives are equipped to make the sort of inferences we would wish. Do they have the requisite skills, and what training do we give to help them make these inferences?

Moving on from crime intelligence, we might consider the area of threat assessment. We could look at this area as a mixture of profiles and facts. Assessments can be based on facts such as direct threats and on profiles inferred from a knowledge of world events. Different levels of analysis are obviously involved. It might be an interesting academic exercise to review the assessments made by both governmental and commercial intelligence-gathering agencies and measure their success against actual world events. Certainly, applying the expert system to this problem would combine a multidisciplinary approach to the factors affecting terrorism with the pure expertise of the “generic” expert.

An opportunity exists for the creation of systems to “advise” practitioners both in the post-incident stage of a terrorist event and in the preemptive stages. In the latter case, screening devices could be used to advise security agencies in a covert manner. For example, vast amounts of data could be utilized in the screening of passengers boarding aircraft to prevent the entry of hijacking teams and in the post-incident stage to provide advisers to negotiators.

The problems of air carriers are classic. Leaving aside the separate danger of proxy bombing, the major difficulty identified by carriers is that of ensuring the security of passengers who board aircraft passing through high-risk countries. Air carriers may be faced with screening up to 400 to 500 passengers in the short time before they board a jumbo jet. The objective is to ensure that no bombs or firearms are taken onto the aircraft, thus lessening the possibility of an armed hijacking taking place. We know that this process is expensive in human and financial terms and, from time to time, ineffective. Another way of undertaking such screening would be to identify from the 400 or so passengers those persons who may be traveling as an undisclosed group-perhaps a hijacking team. Using this method might make it possible to reduce the number of physical checks by eliminating the indiscriminate checking of all the passengers in favor of a more thorough investigation of those highlighted by the screening procedure.

Another form of expert system could be constructed to assist in the post-event phases of terrorist acts such as the critical area of negotiating. Vast experience has been accumulated in siege and hostage situations by relatively few persons. The lessons learned from these experiences form the basis of an expert system which could provide a practical tool to law enforcement personnel.

Understanding the phenomenon of terrorism as distinct from crime in general has taken considerable time and effort. Academics especially have worked on creating data bases that would help them answer questions about how groups behave and the frequency of bombings or particular incidents, but little has been done to create systems that can scan vast amounts of data before providing an answer.
There are a number of opportunities to utilize AI systems in small but important areas of the terrorism “industry”. I have already indicated several options, such as a system to advise and prompt negotiators. Numerous other possibilities exist, from providing training simulators to examining the awareness of corporate executives, who are often the targets of acts of terrorism.

I hope that in the course of this article I have been able to give you an insight into artificial intelligence techniques and expert systems and a taste of their potential within the area of law enforcement. In fact, if we have learned one lesson from our pioneering work in the United Kingdom, which goes back several years, it is that we are still learning and still discovering many potential applications. Expertise in law enforcement investigation is not as definable as the expertise of, say, the hard scientist, the geologist, the physicist, or the chemist. A lot of our expertise lies with the practitioners who, by virtue of doing their jobs over long years, have accumulated vast experience. Whether you talk about expertise or best practice, there is a considerable amount of wisdom, knowledge, and proven method in our approaches. Instead of these being lost to law enforcement when experienced officers leave, information can be gathered into systems which permit such knowledge to live and, above all, be available to the rookie cop.

Our job is about people, emergencies, tension, and adrenaline, and in the field we need fast decisions, not the more leisurely answers to problems given by pundits and professional commentators. It is perhaps an unfortunate fact that law enforcement agencies are expected to respond quickly. Expert systems can give us the cumulative wisdom and knowledge of the best of our people. It would be very shortsighted if we, as practitioners, did not recognize the benefits that these types of systems can offer, for, at the end of the day, it is our reputation and professionalism that is at stake.

So, does all this sound a little dated? It should do. I authored the article nearly 20 years ago. Did it have any profound effect? Not really. Both the British and United States governments chose not to support the development of aircraft passenger screening tools – as did the airlines themselves. And, are we not still trying to get our intelligence act together? Let us hope that if we reprint the article in 20 years things will have moved on a little.

. . . read more